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Abstract
Face anti-spoofing (FAS) plays a vital role in securing
face recognition systems from presentation attacks. Ex-
isting multi-modal FAS methods rely on stacked vanilla
convolutions, which is weak in describing detailed intrin-
sic information from modalities and easily being ineffec-
tive when the domain shifts (e.g., cross attack and cross
ethnicity). In this paper, we extend the central difference
convolutional networks (CDCN) [39] to a multi-modal ver-
sion, intending to capture intrinsic spoofing patterns among
three modalities (RGB, depth and infrared). Meanwhile,
we also give an elaborate study about single-modal based
CDCN. Our approach won the first place in Track Multi-
Modal as well as the second place in Track Single-Modal
(RGB) of ChaLearn Face Anti-spoofing Attack Detection
Challenge@CVPR2020 [20]. Our final submission obtains
1.02±0.59% and 4.84±1.79% ACER in Track Multi-Modal
and Track Single-Modal (RGB), respectively. The codes are
available at https://github.com/ZitongYu/CDCN.
1. Introduction
Face recognition has been widely used in many interac-
tive artificial intelligence systems for its convenience (e.g.,
access control, face payment and device unlock). How-
ever, vulnerability to presentation attacks (PAs) curtails its
reliable deployment. Merely presenting printed images or
videos to the biometric sensor could fool face recognition
systems. Typical examples of presentation attacks are print,
video replay, and 3D masks. For the reliable use of face
recognition systems, face anti-spoofing (FAS) methods are
important to detect such presentation attacks.
In recent years, several hand-crafted feature based [3, 4,
7, 15, 28, 27] and deep learning based [38, 33, 29, 22, 12,
34, 2, 8, 9] methods have been proposed for presentation
attack detection (PAD). On one hand, the classical hand-
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Figure 1. Examples of living and spoofing faces from CASIA-
SURF CeFA dataset [21].
crafted descriptors (e.g., local binary pattern (LBP) [3])
leverage local relationship among the neighbours as the dis-
criminative features, which is robust for describing the de-
tailed invariant information (e.g., color texture, moire´ pat-
tern and noise artifacts) between the living and spoofing
faces. On the other hand, due to the stacked convolution
operations with nonlinear activation, the convolutional neu-
ral networks (CNN) hold strong representation abilities to
distinguish the bona fide from PAs. However, CNN based
methods focus on the deeper semantic features, which are
weak in describing detailed intrinsic information between
living and spoofing faces and easily being ineffective when
acquisition conditions varies (e.g., light illumination and
camera type). In order to solve this issue, central differ-
ence convolutional networks (CDCN) is developed [39] for
single-modal (RGB) FAS task and achieves state-of-the-
art performance on several benchmark datasets. Although
the state-of-the-art single-modal FAS methods are robust in
some existing testing protocols, it is still challenging when
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encountering new kinds of domain shift (e.g., cross ethnic-
ity).
Recently, a large-scale cross-ethnicity face anti-spoofing
dataset, the CASIA-SURF CeFA [21], is established, which
covers three ethnicities, three modalities, 1607 subjects,
and 2D plus 3D attack types. Some typical examples are
shown in Fig. 1. The most challenging protocol 4 (si-
multaneously cross-attack and cross-ethnicity) is utilized
for ChaLearn Face Anti-spoofing Attack Detection Chal-
lenge@CVPR2020 [20]. The baseline results in CASIA-
SURF CeFA dataset [21] indicate: 1) multiple modalities
(i.e., RGB, depth and infrared (IR)) fusion is more robust
than using an arbitrary single modal, and 2) the multi-modal
result, only 31.8±10.0% ACER in protocol 4, is barely
satisfactory. Hence it is necessary to explore more effec-
tive multi-modal FAS methods for cross-attack and cross-
ethnicity testing.
Motivated by the discussions above, we first analyze how
different modality influences the performance of CDCN.
Then we extend CDCN to a multi-modal version, intending
to capture intrinsic spoofing patterns among various modal-
ities. Our contributions include:
• We are the first to utilize CDCN for depth and infrared
modalities based FAS and analyze how CDCN per-
forms with these two modalities. Besides considering
CDCN as a single-modal network, we extend it to a
multi-modal version, which captures rich discrimina-
tive clues among modalities and represents invariant
intrinsic patterns across ethnicities and attacks.
• Our approach won the first place in Track Multi-
Modal1 as well as the second place in Track Single-
Modal (RGB)2 of ChaLearn Face Anti-spoofing At-
tack Detection Challenge@CVPR2020 [20].
2. Related Work
In this section, we first introduce some recent progress
in the single-modal FAS community; and then demonstrate
few recent works about multi-modal FAS. Finally, classical
convolution operators for vision tasks are presented.
Single-Modal Face Anti-Spoofing. Traditional single-
modal face anti-spoofing methods usually extract hand-
crafted features from the RGB facial images to capture the
spoofing patterns. Several classical local descriptors such as
LBP [3, 7], SIFT [27], SURF [5], HOG [15] and DoG [28]
are utilized to extract frame level features while video level
methods usually capture dynamic clues like dynamic tex-
ture [14], micro-motion [32] and eye blinking [24]. More
recently, a few deep learning based methods are proposed
for both frame level and video level face anti-spoofing. For
1https://competitions.codalab.org/competitions/23318
2https://competitions.codalab.org/competitions/22151
frame level methods [39, 29, 16, 26, 9, 12], deep CNN mod-
els are utilized to extract features in a binary-classification
setting. In contrast, auxiliary depth supervised FAS meth-
ods [2, 22] are introduced to learn more detailed informa-
tion effectively. On the other hand, several video level
CNN methods are presented to exploit the dynamic spatio-
temporal [33, 34, 19] or rPPG [17, 22, 18, 36, 37, 31]
features for PAD. Despite achieving state-of-the-art per-
formance, single-modal methods are easily influenced by
unseen domain shift (e.g., cross ethnicity and cross attack
types) and not robust for challenging cases (e.g., harsh en-
vironment and realistic attacks).
Multi-Modal Face Anti-Spoofing. There are also few
works for multi-modal face anti-spoofing. Zhang et al. [40]
take ResNet18 as the backbone and propose a three-stream
network, where the input of each stream is RGB, Depth and
IR face images, respectively. Then, these features are con-
catenated and passed to the last two residual blocks. Alek-
sandr et al. [25] also consider the similar fusion network
with three streams. ResNet34 is chosen as the backbone
and multi-scale features are fused at all residual blocks. Tao
et al. [30] present a multi-stream CNN architecture called
FaceBagNet. In order to enhance the local detailed repre-
sentation ability, patch-level images are adopted as inputs.
Moreover, modality feature erasing operation is designed
to prevent overfitting and obtain more robust modal-fused
features. All previous methods just consider standard back-
bone (ResNet) with stacked vanilla convolutions for mul-
tiple modalities, which might be weak in representing the
intrinsic features between living and spoofing faces.
Convolution Operators. The convolution operator is
commonly used in extracting basic visual features in deep
learning framework. Recently extensions to the vanilla con-
volution operator have been proposed. In one direction,
classical local descriptors (e.g., LBP [1] and Gabor filters
[11]) are considered into convolution design. Representa-
tive works include Local Binary Convolution [13] and Ga-
bor Convolution [23], which are proposed for saving com-
putational cost and enhancing the resistance to the spatial
changes, respectively. Recently, Yu et al. propose Central
Difference Convolution (CDC) [39], which is suitable for
FAS task because of its excellent representation ability for
detailed intrinsic patterns. Another direction is to modify
the spatial scope for aggregation. Two related works are
dialated convolution [35] and deformable convolution [6].
However, these convolution operators are always designed
for RGB modality, it is still unknown how they perform for
depth and IR modalities.
In order to overcome the above-mentioned drawbacks
and fill in the blank, we extend the state-of-the-art single-
modal network CDCN to a multi-modal version for chal-
lenging cross-ethnicity and cross-attack FAS task.
3. Methodology
In this section, we will first introduce CDC [39] as a
preliminary in Section 3.1, then demonstrate our single-
modal and multi-modal neural architectures in Section 3.2
and Section 3.3, respectively. At last the supervision signals
and loss functions are presented in Section 3.4.
3.1. Preliminary: CDC
The feature maps and convolution can be represented in
3D shape (2D spatial domain and extra channel dimension)
in modern deep learning frameworks. For simplicity, all
convolutions in this paper are described in 2D while exten-
sion to 3D is straightforward.
Vanilla Convolution. There are two main steps in the
2D spatial convolution: 1) sampling local receptive field
region R over the input feature map x; 2) aggregation of
sampled values via weighted summation. Hence, the output
feature map y can be formulated as
y(p0) =
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn), (1)
where p0 denotes current location on both input and out-
put feature maps while pn enumerates the locations in
R. For instance, local receptive field region for convo-
lution operation with 3×3 kernel and dilation 1 is R =
{(−1,−1), (−1, 0), · · · , (0, 1), (1, 1)}.
Central Difference Convolution. For FAS task, the
discriminative and robust features indicate fine-grained liv-
ing/spoofing patterns and environment invariant clues, re-
spectively. Local gradient operator (e.g., basic element in
local binary pattern (LBP) [3]), as a residual and difference
term, is able to capture rich detailed patterns and not easily
affected by external changes.
Inspired by LBP [3], we introduce central difference
context into vanilla convolution to enhance its representa-
tion and generalization capacity. Similar to vanilla convo-
lution, central difference convolution also consists of two
steps, i.e., sampling and aggregation. The sampling step
is similar to that in vanilla convolution while the aggrega-
tion step is different: central difference convolution prefers
to aggregate the center-oriented gradient of sampled values.
Thus Eq. (1) becomes
y(p0) =
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · (x(p0 + pn)− x(p0)). (2)
When pn = (0, 0), the gradient value always equals to zero
with respect to the central location p0 itself.
As both the intensity-level semantic information and
gradient-level detailed message are crucial for distinguish-
ing the living and spoofing faces, which indicates that com-
bining vanilla convolution with central difference convo-
lution might be a feasible manner to provide more robust
Vanilla Convolution  
Central Difference Convolution
Generalized Central 
Difference Convolution
(CDC)expand
Figure 2. Generalized central difference convolution (CDC).
modeling capacity. As illustrated in Fig. 2, we generalize
central difference convolution as
y(p0) = θ ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · (x(p0 + pn)− x(p0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
central difference convolution
+(1− θ) ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vanilla convolution
,
(3)
where hyperparameter θ ∈ [0, 1] tradeoffs the contribution
between intensity-level and gradient-level information. The
higher value of θ means the more importance of central dif-
ference gradient information. Similar to [39], we refer to
this generalized central difference convolution as CDC.
3.2. Single-Modal CDCN
We follow the similar configuration ‘CDCN++’ [39] as
our single-modal backbone, including low-mid-high level
cells and Multiscale Attention Fusion Module (MAFM). In
the consideration of the large-scale training data in CASIA-
SURF CeFA dataset, we set the initial channel number as 80
instead of 64. The specific network is shown in Fig. 3(a).
Single-modal face image with size 256×256×3 is taken as
the network input and the output is the predicted 32×32
grayscale mask.
3.3. Multi-Modal CDCN
We adopt the configuration ‘CDCN’ [39] as the back-
bone of each modality branch as we find the MAFM would
drop the performance when using multi-modal fusion. As
illustrated in Fig. 3(b), the backbone network of each
modality branch is not shared. Thus each branch is able
to learn modality-aware features independently. The multi-
level features from each modality branch are fused via con-
catenation. Finally, the two head layers aggregate the multi-
modal features and predict the grayscale mask.
As the feature-level fusion strategy might not be optimal
for all protocols, we also try two other fusion strategies: 1)
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Figure 3. The architecture of (a) single-model and (b) multi-modal CDCN. The red thin rectangle denotes a max pool layer with stride 2.
‘CDC 2 r’ means using two stacked CDC to increase channel number with ratio r first and then decrease back to the original channel size.
input-level fusion via concatenating three-modal inputs to
256×256×9 directly, and 2) score-level fusion via weight-
ing the predicted score from each modality. For these two
fusion strategies, the architecture of single-modal CDCN
(see Fig. 3(a)) is used. The corresponding ablation study
will be shown in Section 4.4.
3.4. Supervision
Compared with traditional guidance from the binary
scalar score, pixel-wise supervision [9] helps to learn more
discriminative patterns between living and spoofing faces.
As a result, our network prefets to predict 32×32 grayscale
mask instead of traditional scalar score. In terms of ground
truth label, we generate the binary mask via simply set
the non-zero pixel value to ‘1’ because the intensity values
of non-face background have already been ‘0’ in CASIA-
SURF CeFA dataset.
For the loss function, mean square error loss LMSE is
Figure 4. The kernel KCDLn in contrastive depth loss..
utilized for pixel-wise supervision, which is formulated:
LMSE = 1
H ×W
∑
i∈H,j∈W
(Bpre(i,j) −Bgt(i,j))2, (4)
where H,W denote the height and width of the binary
mask, respectively, and Bpre and Bgt mean the predicted
grayscale mask and ground truth binary mask, respectively.
Moreover, for the sake of fine-grained supervision needs in
FAS task, contrastive depth loss (CDL) LCDL [33] is con-
sidered to help the networks learn more detailed features.
Table 1. Albation study of the hyperparameter θ with RGB modality.
Single-Modal CDCN Protocol 4@1 Protocol 4@2 Protocol 4@3 OverallAPCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) ACER(%)
θ=0.5 12.61 4.0 8.31 6.67 2.0 4.33 4.56 8.5 6.53 6.39
θ=0.6 11.67 8.0 9.83 10.56 3.0 6.78 3.89 5.0 4.44 7.02
θ=0.7 12.83 1.25 7.04 13.33 2.0 7.67 3.72 3.0 3.36 6.02
θ=0.8 14.33 1.5 7.92 10.0 6.25 8.13 3.83 7.25 5.54 7.19
θ=0.9 11.17 2.5 6.83 21.33 5.75 13.54 3.56 7.5 5.53 8.63
Table 2. Results of Single-Modal CDCN (θ=0.7) with different modalities.
Modality Protocol 4@1 Protocol 4@2 Protocol 4@3 OverallAPCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) ACER(%)
RGB 12.83 1.25 7.04 13.33 2.0 7.67 3.72 3.0 3.36 6.02
Depth 5.22 1.25 3.24 2.72 0.5 1.61 4.94 1.75 3.35 2.73
IR 1.56 1.0 1.28 27.72 0.25 13.99 29.56 0.5 15.03 10.1
Table 3. Best submission result in Track Single-Modal (RGB).
Method Protocol 4@1 Protocol 4@2 Protocol 4@3 OverallAPCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) ACER(%)
SD-Net [21] - - - - - - - - - 35.2±5.8
Ours (Single-Modal) 11.17 2.5 6.83 6.67 2.0 4.33 3.72 3.0 3.36 4.84±1.79
CDL can be formulated as
LCDL =
∑
i∈H,j∈W,n∈N (K
CDL
n Bpre(i,j) −KCDLn Bgt(i,j))2
H ×W ×N ,
(5)
whereKCDLn is the n-th contrastive convolution kernel, and
N denotes the kernel numbers. The details of the kernels
(N = 8) can be found in Fig. 4. Finally, the overall loss
Loverall can be formulated as Loverall = LMSE + LCDL.
4. Experiments
In this section, extensive experiments are performed to
demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. In the follow-
ing, we sequentially describe the employed datasets & met-
rics (Sec. 4.1), implementation details (Sec. 4.2), results
(Sec. 4.3 - 4.4) and visualization (Sec. 4.5).
4.1. Datasets and Metrics
CASIA-SURF CeFA Dataset [21]. CASIA-SURF
CeFA aims to provide with the largest up to date face anti-
spoofing dataset to allow for the evaluation of the gener-
alization performance cross-ethnicity and cross-attacks. It
consists of 2D and 3D attack subsets. For the 2D attack
subset, it includes print and video-reply attacks, and three
ethnicites (African, East Asian and Central Asian) with two
attacks (print face from cloth and video-replay). Each eth-
nicity has 500 subjects. Each subject has one real sample,
two fake samples of print attack captured in indoor and out-
door, and 1 fake sample of video-replay. In total, there are
18000 videos (6000 per modality).
There are four evaluation protocols in CASIA-SURF
CeFA for cross-ethnicity, cross-attack, cross-modality, and
cross-ethnicity & cross-attack testing. In this paper, our ex-
periments are all conducted on the most challenging pro-
tocol 4 (cross-ethnicity & cross-attack), which has been
utilized for ChaLearn Face Anti-spoofing Attack Detection
Challenge@CVPR2020.
Performance Metrics. Three metrics, i.e., Attack Pre-
sentation Classification Error Rate (APCER), Bona Fide
Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER), and Av-
erage Classification Error Rate (ACER) [10] are utilized for
performance comparison. They can be formulated as
APCER =
FP
TN + FP
,
BPCER =
FN
FN + TP
,
ACER =
APCER+BPCER
2
,
(6)
where FP , FN , TN and TP denote the false positive,
false negative, true negative and true positive sample num-
bers, respectively. ACER is used to determine the final
ranking in ChaLearn Face Anti-spoofing Attack Detection
Challenge@CVPR2020.
4.2. Implementation Details
Our proposed method is implemented with Pytorch. In
the training stage, models are trained with Adam optimizer
and the initial learning rate and weight decay are 1e-4 and
5e-5, respectively. We train models with 50 epochs while
learning rate halves every 20 epochs. The batch size is 8
on a P100 GPU. In the testing stage, we calculate the mean
value of the predicted grayscle map as the final score.
4.3. Single-Modal Testing
In this subsection, we give the ablation study about the
hyperparameter θ with RGB modality firstly. Then based on
the optimal θ for CDCN, we test depth and IR modalities.
Table 4. Ablation study of fusion strategies for multi-modal CDCN. We only report the results tried in the FAS challenge.
Modality Protocol 4@1 Protocol 4@2 Protocol 4@3APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
Feature-level fusion 0.33 0.5 0.42 5.89 3.25 4.57 4.22 3.25 3.74
Input-level fusion 0.5 3.75 2.13 5.67 1.5 3.58 2.61 3.25 2.93
Score-level fusion - - - 1.39 0.75 1.07 1.44 1.75 1.6
Table 5. Best submission result in Track Multi-Modal.
Method Protocol 4@1 Protocol 4@2 Protocol 4@3 OverallAPCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) ACER(%)
PSMM-Net [21] 33.3 15.8 24.5 78.2 8.3 43.2 50.0 5.5 27.7 31.8±10.0
Ours (Multi-Modal) 0.33 0.5 0.42 1.39 0.75 1.07 1.44 1.75 1.6 1.02±0.59
Finally, we summarize our best submission results in Track
Single Modal (RGB) on ChaLearn Face Anti-spoofing At-
tack Detection Challenge@CVPR2020.
Impact of θ with RGB modality. As shown in Ta-
ble 1, the best overall performance (ACER=6.02%) is
achieved when θ = 0.7, which is consistent with the evi-
dence in [39]. As for the sub-protocols, θ = 0.9, θ = 0.5
and θ = 0.7 obtain the lowest ACER in protocol 4@1
(6.83%), 4@2 (4.33%) and 4@3 (3.36%), respectively.
Results of Depth and IR modalities. Table 2 shows
the results of different modalities using single-modal
CDCN when θ = 0.7. It is surprising that the perfor-
mance varies a lot across modalities. The IR modality per-
forms the best in protocol 4@1 (testing without Africa) but
the worst in protocol 4@2 and 4@3 (testing with Africa),
indicating that the IR modality generalizes poorly for un-
seen Africa ethnicity. Compared with RGB and IR modal-
ities, the depth modality is more robust and discriminative
in most cases (e.g., print attacks in testing stage) because
the 3D depth shape is quite distinguishable between living
and print faces. The excellent overall performance indicates
central difference convolution is not only suitable for RGB
modality, but also for IR and depth modalities.
Best Submission Result in Track Single-Modal
(RGB). Our best submission result (4.84±1.79% ACER)
is shown in Table 3, which wins the second place in Track
Single-Modal (RGB) on ChaLearn Face Anti-spoofing At-
tack Detection Challenge@CVPR2020. This final result is
combined with the best sub-protocols results (i.e., θ =0.9,
0.5 and 0.7, respectively).
4.4. Multi-Modal Testing
In this subsection, three fusion strategies are studied in
multi-modal testing. Then the best submission results in
Track Multi-Modal will be presented.
Multi-Modal Fusion Strategies. As shown in Table 4,
our proposed multi-modal CDCN (i.e., feature-level fusion
with three modalities) achieves the lowest ACER (0.42%)
in protocol 4@1. When using the concatenated inputs with
three modalities (input-level fusion), the CDCN could ob-
tain comparable performance with the single-modal results
in Table 2. However, it still causes the performance drops
compared with the best single-modal results (i.e., IR modal-
ity for protocol 4@1, depth modality for protocol 4@2 and
protocol 4@3). It also reflects the issue for both feature-
and input-level fusion, i.e., simple fusion with concatena-
tion might be sub-optimal because it is weak in representing
and selecting the importance of modalities. It is worth ex-
ploring more effective fusion methods (e.g., attention mech-
anism for modalities) in future.
Based on the prior results in Table 2, we weight the re-
sults of RGB and depth modalities averagely as the score-
level fusion (i.e., fusion score = 0.5∗RGB score+0.5∗
depth score). As shown in Table 4 (the third row), this
simple ensemble strategy helps to boost the performance
significantly. Compared with single-depth modality, score-
level fusion gives 0.54% and 1.13% ACER improvements
for protocol 4@2 and 4@3, respectively.
Best Submission Result in Track Multi-Modal. Ta-
ble 3 shows our best submission result (1.02±0.59%
ACER), which wins the first place in Track Multi-Modal on
ChaLearn FAS Attack Detection Challenge@CVPR2020.
This final result is combined with the best sub-protocols
results (i.e., feature-level fusion for protocol 4@1 while
score-level fusion for protocol 4@2 and 4@3).
4.5. Feature Visualization
The visualizations of CDCN with three modalities are
shown in Fig. 5. On one hand, it is clear that the low-
level, mid-level and high-level features in CDCN are dis-
tinguishable between living and spoofing faces among all
three modalities. In terms of low-level features, the living
have more detailed texture (especially in IR modality). As
for the high-level features, the living face regions are purer
and plainer while the spoofing ones are with more spoofin-
g/noise patterns.
On the other hand, depth and IR modalities are comple-
mentary to RGB modality and helpful for robust liveness
detection. We can see from the last row in Fig. 5 that CDCN
fails to detect spoofing1 only using RGB input while spoof-
ing1 could be accurately detected by depth or IR inputs.
Figure 5. Visualization of CDCN with three modalities.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we give an elaborate study about the
applications of central difference convolutional networks
(CDCN) [39] for multiple modalities in face anti-spoofing
(FAS) task. The experimental results indicate the effective-
ness of CDCN for both single-modal and multi-modal FAS.
The proposed approach wins the first place in Track Multi-
Modal as well as the second place in Track Single-Modal
(RGB) of ChaLearn Face Anti-spoofing Attack Detection
Challenge@CVPR2020.
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